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I 
 
I am become my enemy whom I could not please 
and am imagined to be whom I am not 
for she was not me although her interpretations 
suited her best should I have no where to lean my face 
except against the cup of the palm of this hand 
that hides the life I could not live 
having fallen young into my mind 
having fallen further than answers would give 
an astute reply to martial arms 
had I words I could confidently write 
& not be told that they were an excuse 
I might find the time to warm into less fright. 
 
I try to confine my expansive capacity 
and am told that I am not known for my hospitality. 
 
—Grace Lake, Tondo Aquatique (1997) 
 
Grace Lake’s sonnet paints an introspective Icarian fall, a plunge well beyond the public parameters 
of mere bathos. Insistent against longstanding enfeeblement, this self declaims: “I am become.” 
Individuality retraces its capacities for cohering and steering, testing the plausibility of the person 
called “I.” The lived subject is pitted against a “she” bound to the endlessness of interpretation.1 She 
is a “me” and an exacting, relentless enemy. Unquiet, the “I” cannot incline toward or rest 
comfortably upon this self. Far from reassured by “the fullness of [her] decline,” the speaker dives 
into a bottomless ne plus ultra of suspicion.2 The climate of this submersive, anxious region is cold 
with fear, its fluid boundary menaced and marked by an accusative “you” that is herself as other, 
and, come the volta (if not before), others, full stop. Absent from articulation, the pronoun “you” 
nevertheless pervades, deploring declarations as mere justifications. That same “you” labels 
ungenerous attempts to shore up the ruination that this being is become. Embedded, persistent 
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questions go unanswered, answers do not give, nor do those who seek them.3 What brought this “I” 
to this descending impasse? Violence? This abyss is “an astute reply to martial arms,” arms that end 
in a cupped palm, the locus of an unreadable, unrealisable future, haunted by dictates past and 
present, imagined and painfully real.  
But haven’t we been here before, poetically speaking? In 1888, Verlaine asks: “is it not true 
that et nunc et semper et in secula the sincere poet will see himself, will feel himself, will know himself 
damned by the rule of any faction”?4 The factions in question can be as small as Lake’s subjective 
dyad, as when Rimbaud needs “complete protection, even against [him]self!” (78). Rimbaud is 
condemned by his own reticence, his refusal of acknowledgement, his envisaged resistance to 
inclusion in the coterie of Verlaine’s construction, les poètes maudits (60). Defined by the war it wages 
on binaries, the cursed poets sling paradoxes and oxymorons, revelling in the agonies of ambiguity. 
Or perhaps not quite. Transcendent poet, abject obscurantist, le poète maudit is: “Absolute by 
imagination, absolute in expression....But cursed!” (12). Is the curse, then, the torturous prophecy of 
a future marked by contradiction, uncertainty, equivocation? 
Torturous or no, assuredly self-fulfilling. 
 
II 
Embodied as weakness, vacillation takes about a century to wend its hesitant, dogged way from 
aesthetic, gendered, “degenerate” performance, to puling David resisting the Goliath of metaphysics, 
to the deliberately shaky foundation of contemporary ethics, criticism, and theory. Sotto voce, 
weakness announces a crisis of ideology, of putting the “I”—becoming or stagnate, cursed or 
celebrated—at the centre of thought and action. With this refusal of the ubiquitous, self-important 
Human comes a refusal of the self-assured human. “We moderns with our anxious care for 
ourselves and love of our neighbour…appear as a weak age,” Nietzsche writes, condemnatory flag at 
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half-mast. For Nietzsche’s weakness refers to the presumptuousness of our values, our continued 
faith in “scientificality” and philosophical truths, not to mention our smug moral rectitude, the 
comfort we take in aspiring to “the good” (91).5 Nietzsche attributes this unthinking continuity to 
volitional fatigue and inevitability; the former comprising a décadence ascribable to individuals and the 
fin-de-siècle as a whole, the latter part of a trans-historical, inevitable cycle of decline.6 Resigned pliancy 
infuriates Nietzsche, but he identifies as a decadent, as complicit in this very ideological malaise, one 
crucial to the variations and incongruities of his own philosophy.7 “How does one compromise 
oneself today?” he asks in Twilight of the Idols. “By being consistent. By going in a straight line. By 
being less than ambiguous” (77). It is 1889, and the semantic reversal of weakness is well underway. 
 As such, Emmanuel Levinas is far from the first philosopher to use weakness as a 
philosophical metaphor, although he is arguably unique in generating a hermeneutics of radical 
passivity, a humanism defined by the negation that is a perpetual deferral to otherness.8 For Levinas 
stubbornly refuses to give up the category human, instead reworking its heroic terms. Subjectivity 
itself is Levinas’s accursed share; we are all maudits, condemned to the narrow confines of our 
individual, mortal selves. Be they regretful, anticipatory, or lived, our sufferings are not, for Levinas, 
“the vicarious but private martyrdom of the beautiful soul” but are rooted in an openness to the 
incomprehensible Other to whom we are forever obliged, a responsibility Levinas considers pre-
originary, exceeding the mandatory, the constitutive (xxxiii-iv).9 While the foundation of Levinas’s 
thinking was constructed during his internment in World War II, the essays gathered under the title 
Humanism of the Other are written just before, during, and in the immediate aftermath of the May ’68 
uprisings.10 In these writings, his once-censorious attitude toward art softens, so that he now speaks 
freely of art as a guide to contemporary spiritual life.11 And his terms and references are often, rather 
curiously and persistently, decadent. Levinas envisions ethics as “[t]he swoon of being fainting into 
humanity” (6), and aligns radical passivity with a willed unhealthiness reminiscent of the “eternal 
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convalescen[ce]” that defines Baudelaire’s ideal artistic genius.12 And Levinas directly credits 
Baudelaire with teaching us “that sensible givens overflow, by their significations, the element where 
they are supposedly confined” (12). In Rimbaud, Levinas finds more than a self-absorbed poète 
maudit, asking: “Is it certain that Rimbaud’s ‘I is another’ means only alteration, alienation, betrayal 
of self, strangeness of self, and servitude to that stranger?” (62).13 Levinas claims that the statement 
“I is another” may well encapsulate the humility of the individual who “puts himself in the other’s place, 
that is, accuses himself of the other’s illness or pain” (62). If “I is another,” that other may well be 
an “enemy whom I could not please.” Regardless, an “expansive capacity” is needed, an infinite 
hospitality in the face of an always bewildering, possibly antagonistic otherness, no matter what 
hardship that vulnerability causes the subject. 
 Aesthetically and philosophically, Humanism of the Other is indebted to the nineteenth century. 
Not only because Levinas identifies the Nietzschean wake in which he trails, rejecting the pursuit or 
ownership of truth, equating the end of humanism with the death of metaphysics, and insisting, with 
historically-informed fatigue on show, that “in our time, metaphysics keeps on ending and the end 
of metaphysics is our metaphysics” (47). But also because Levinas recognises the cumulative 
exacerbation of the problems that Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche so presciently diagnosed, among 
them, alienations individual and social. In the previous century, Levinas argues, alienation was 
believed transitory, even transcendental, a means of “bring[ing] a surplus of consciousness and 
clarity to the fulfilment of things.” By extension and contrast: 
Today’s angst is more profound. It comes from seeing revolutions founder in bureaucracy 
and repression and totalitarian violence passing for revolution. Because disalienation itself is 
alienated in them. In the revolutionary enterprise led with extreme consciousness that 
nevertheless undoes the vigilant intention that desires it, in action ripped out of the firm 
hand—the iron fist—that guides it, fails or at least is denounced the recurrence to self, the idea 
of an ego that is identified in finding itself. The reunion of self and self is a flop. Interiority is 
not rigorously interior. I is another. Is not identity itself a failure? (60) 
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Eliding direct reference to his source—almost assuredly the “disalienation” of Fanon’s Peau Noire, 
Masques Blancs (1952)—Levinas then denounces the associated revolutionary programme of Les 
Damnés de la Terre (1961), stating unequivocally that it replicates the problem it battles against, a 
charge he extends to identity politics writ large.14 These are the sorts of claims that underpin a quiet 
critical fury about the absoluteness of Levinas’s otherness, an absoluteness that reinforces an agenda 
of difference that too easily yields to discrimination. Surely post-identity is as ruthless as the post-
humanism that Levinas opposes? 15 This difficulty is compounded by Levinas’s refusal of protest at 
the very moment when civil rights, not to mention liberatory movements of gender and sexuality, 
are just gaining voice via the vigilant tactics Levinas questions. Like Nietzsche before him, Levinas 
remains open to the charge of conservatism, of a failure to produce a clear system that results in a 
systematic failure: his call for a new ethics ironically sustains outdated privilege.  
 “Is not identity itself a failure?” Levinas’s question is sincerely posed, and is posed, still 
further, by participants in and direct benefactors of late twentieth-century minority influence.16 
Nietzsche’s engagement with decadence and decline is inextricable from his fears about the 
homogenisation of an increasingly democratic world, one that might eradicate oppressive social 
hierarchies, but also risks losing differences creative and intellectual.17 After the Second World War, 
Levinas turns to narratives of wilful passivity to combat fears about the obliteration of the humanity 
of the human, an eradication he perceives in Heidegger, his philosophical precursor, who yielded too 
entirely to the category “Being” rather than the human beings that very ontology might serve, 
elucidate, inform. This fear prompts Levinas’s conclusionary return, in Humanism of the Other, to the 
1968 protesters. He wants to know “if the aspirations of today’s youth, despite the violence and 
irresponsibility in which these aspirations degenerate, can do without thought devoted to subjectivity 
defined from responsibility and against the [Heideggerean] notion of being”? (68). With just a hint of 
Max Nordau on offer, Levinas insists upon the degeneration of this generation, its too-consuming 
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violence. But admiration tempers condemnation: youth contested the individual conditioned by 
capitalism, one perceived “as accumulation in being, by honours, titles, professional competence—
ontological tumefaction weighting so heavily on others as to crush them, instituting a hierarchical 
society that maintains itself beyond the necessities of consumption.” At its best, 1968 affirmed a 
“vulnerability more passive than all passivity,” and our definitional “debt to the other” (76). 
Language was central: although admittedly “contesting a world already denounced long ago,” young 
people gave new life to the clichéd terms of protest. In “certain great moments,” these young people 
uttered speech that ruptured the everyday, yielded fully to otherness, and deployed the “Nietzschean 
word, prophetic word.” Aspirational if evanescent, these articulations were “quickly extinguished by 
a language just as wordy and conformist as the one it was supposed to replace” (69). Refuting 
triumphalism, disparaging violence, Levinas nevertheless lauds how May ’68 orchestrated an 
epiphanic vision of humanity briefly lifted from the curse of subjectivity. 
 
III 
Then known as Anne Mendleson (later and heretofore, Anna Mendelssohn), Grace Lake was in a 
car with the American poet Ed Dorn, among others, en route to Paris, at some point in the spring of 
1968. Evidence that she entered the boundaries of the French capital remains scant.18 Mendelssohn 
was almost twenty: a student midway into a degree in comparative studies at the University of Essex, 
a fledgling poet, and a political activist.19 Founded in 1964, Essex quickly became a notoriously 
radical university, and in the spring of 1968, was shut down by a student protest against a visiting 
speaker from Porton Down, Britain’s most renowned military research institute.20 Mendelssohn took 
part in this protest; around this time, she also makes an appearance in Jean-Luc Godard’s 
documentary on student unrest in England, British Sounds (1969).21 In 1970, still enrolled at Essex, 
Mendelssohn moved to London, where she wrote for countercultural periodicals and agitated on 
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behalf of squatters’ rights.22 A discrete, three-page portion of her fragmented and incomplete 
memoir reflects upon this period. The memoir was written over the course of twenty years; this 
untitled section was likely written in the late seventies.23 It is quoted here almost in full. 
I thought I had all the answers—that if only everybody else could see then it would be 
alright. I thought they were wrong and I was right—we were right. The problem is thinking 
you’re right—the world is as it is today because of people thinking they’re right and I fell 
right into that trap—I’m right/you’re wrong. Irresistible force meets immovable object… 
The problem was thinking what’s right for myself was right for everyone else, that it would 
be alright once they change. 
I was brought up, like everyone, that certain things are right and certain things are wrong; an 
ideology, a belief system, a morality, an interpretation of reality. Well that felt all wrong, and 
I started questioning it, and blaming my misery on the people and the structure trying to 
make me a certain way. They were providing me with answers, and I questioned those 
answers, they didn’t fit me and I didn’t fit them. I was miserable, I saw misery all around me, 
and I created a new set of answers—only if they change can I be happy, and along with that 
came a dissection and an analysis of the structure, the misery manufacturing soul destroying 
State. 
I found joy in sharing my questioning with others, giving validity to that questioning, to 
diving into unmapped, untrodden territory. We lost our way many times—in a world full of 
answers it’s hard to hold a question, when all you know is what feels wrong. Friendships 
suffered, we all expected of ourselves and each other to have the answer, and we fell into 
despair and mistrust. The joy turned sour. There was no nourishment for us in the world we 
were born to, and the initial fuel we had found in each other was burning out. It was a lonely 
time. And I blamed the State for our alienation—though by that time I was numb from the 
harm we do to each other.24 
It hit me that our political activities arose out of despair—that I never really believed that the 
revolution was possible anyway, let alone inevitable. Everything out there was all too big, too 
complicated, to take on; too anarchic to make any logical sense of. I’d slowly progressed 
from world politics to city (London) politics to local politics, till finally I was left with the 
smallest unit—myself.25 
And without a sense of humour what can be done?  
 
Humour is a question that remains live in Mendelssohn’s writing and thinking, a cogent means of 
addressing the absurdities and extremities of human endeavour in general, and revolutionary protest 
in particular. In this piece, it is one of a series of questions, as when Mendelssohn wonders why she 
felt she knew best, where lies joy, and specifically: “Why should I feel guilty about being happy?” 
She looks to a pastoral idyll once enjoyed in Wales (possibly in 1972) as a time when the natural 
world, namely flowers, could be observed “quietly getting on with blooming without asking 
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themselves if that’s OK or not by anyone else, let alone the State.”26 Growing doubts about endless 
doubting coalesce around the question of self categorisation. Mendelssohn continues: 
Who am I if I’m not a revolutionary? 
I was terrified of losing that identity, it had been a source of such joy and such sharing. I was 
terrified of that label being replaced by another—hippy, dropout, sellout, escapist. None of 
those fitted me. Only no-label—only a new openness to that unmapped untrodden territory 
[….] I was alone, and could only look to myself, finally, for validity. There was no 
nourishment anymore in the Revolution as the Solution. 
And then I thought I’d found the new solution—the revolution only changes the form of 
things, is still an interference, an imposition of ideas, the same as it replaces—going in is the 
only way out, the inner alchemy will bring the outer transformation. At least my new 
solution wasn’t linear, at least it wasn’t so blind, so self-deceiving. But still it was a solution, 
an answer, me thinking I know, that if only every one else could see things like me, be 
persuaded—still it was a violence.  
I realised that I can’t bear things as they are because I can’t bear pain. That I can’t bear 
others’ pain because I can’t bear my own pain [….] That really I don’t know anything, I 
don’t have a solution, I’m not a great saviour. I’m just me. I’m just a question mark, and the 
world is my playground. 
Solutions are just another form of violence—State violence or revolutionary violence, what’s 
the difference? It takes 2 to play that ball-game and I don’t want to play it—though I’m sure 
I will lots and lots more times because I’ll forget, because rules make you feel like you know 
what’s going on, and there’s always the hope of winning… 
 
The world, Mendelssohn continues, is irrefutably ugly. Political governance is always violence against 
the individual; imposing solutions upon others is also “plain violent.” She concludes: 
And now that I’m not a revolutionary, that I’m not trying to change the world, that I’m not 
trying to stop the ugliness so that I don’t have to feel my pain—I’m overcome by wave upon 
wave of it. Finally I belong. The pain is me, I am pain. And I am the flower and the hills and 
the trees, the laughter and the song…27 
 
Written twenty years before Mendelssohn’s sonnet, this autobiographical passage unmistakeably 
anticipates its terms. A youthful dive “into unmapped, untrodden territory” is thrillingly, then 
nauseatingly, vertiginous; things fall apart, and questioning peripheries cannot hold in a world so 
insistently replete with answers. Forward-facing faces have “no where to lean….except against” the 
immediate self, “the cup of the palm of this hand” that hides as much as it protects. Mendelssohn 
finds that revolutionary language quickly becomes as conformist, and as violent, as that which it was 
meant to replace. And in the aftermath of revolutionary fervour, she is thrust painfully upon her 
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own identity, condemned to a subjectivity wracked by irresolvable scrutiny. Is this eternal incertitude 
the bleak culmination of Nietzsche’s philosophy? 
Mendelssohn’s was an incredibly erudite, voracious mind, one that indubitably engaged in 
her later years with the thinking of Emmanuel Levinas, among countless others.28 But what saves her 
from yielding completely to pain is not her often sardonic sense of humour, not her late night piano 
compositions, not even the loyalty she charismatically engendered from dozens of admiring, patient 
friends, associates, readers. Ultimately, Mendelssohn is rescued by the merciful inexorability of Art, 
by material expanses of page and canvas, by figuration and representation, by language that heals 
and maims, then heals again. And if we, good modernist inheritors all, mistrust her identification 
with the natural—“I am the flower and the hills and the trees”—we’re right to do so: this halcyon 
vision is unsustainable, as the utopia of a world where one can simply, restfully be, a world of 
permissible questions and plainly self-evident answers will always be beyond Mendelssohn’s reach. 
For her, these ambiguities will remain an agony as violent as any solution. 
 
IV 
Anna Mendelssohn was born in 1948 in Stockport, a town near Manchester. Her father Morris was a 
respected Labour councillor who fought with the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil 
War. Her mother, Clementina, was a member of the Manchester International Women for Peace, 
and took an active part in the family business, a local market stall. The family’s Jewish heritage was 
central, defining: a certificate in Mendelssohn’s papers confirms that on the occasion of her first 
birthday, her parents had three trees planted in Israel in their daughter’s name.29 During World War 
II, Tina volunteered to care for refugee Jewish children, some rescued from concentration camps, 
and this harrowing experience was often recounted to Mendelssohn and her younger sister Judi. 
Though both of her parents were forced to leave school and seek employment in their early teens, 
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they were clearly intellectually ambitious for their offspring: newspaper clippings of Mendelssohn’s 
childhood achievements indicate that she grew up in a cultured household, entering music and 
elocution contests, performing in local theatre productions and the Manchester Youth Orchestra.30 
Mendelssohn was Head Girl at Stockport High School for Girls, and like so many of her generation, 
became the first member of her family to attend university. 
From the late seventies until her death in 2009, Mendelssohn compiled a half dozen works 
of short fiction and some fifteen collections of poetry, including three collections with Equipage 
Press and her perfect-bound volume, Implacable Art (2000).31 Throughout these decades, 
Mendelssohn published avidly in journals receptive to experimental writing, among them, Parataxis, 
Jacket 2, and Critical Quarterly. The presses Methuen, Bloodaxe, and Burning Deck actively pursued 
book-length editions of her work. From 1990 to 2004, her writing was included in five major 
anthologies, among them, Denise Riley’s Poets on Writing (1992) and Iain Sinclair’s influential 
Conductors of Chaos (1996).32 By the late eighties, Mendelssohn was inundated with invitations to read 
from Cambridge colleges, London’s Royal Festival Hall, the Southbank Centre, associates in New 
York and New Hampshire, and, in 1997, the Pompidou Centre in Paris. And none of this literary 
endeavour even begins to encapsulate the extent of Mendelssohn’s visual art. Though she worked 
with pastel, coloured pencil, felt-tip pens, oil, and water colour, Mendelssohn’s mature artwork is 
predominantly pen and ink, a medium in which she skilfully blurs the divide between the written and 
the pictorial. Perhaps most stunning in this regard are her accomplished experiments in an 
ideogrammatic tradition, which gesture to the work of Pound, Michaux, and Jack Smith of the 
Kitchen Sink School. Mendelssohn’s international modernist credentials are impeccable: during a 
trip to Turkey in 1969, she translated the poetry of political exile Nâzim Hikmet; late in life, she met 
and began compiling the work of the surrealist Gisele Prassinos, the child prodigy “discovered” by 
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André Breton. Her poetry considers revolutionary modernists Anna Ahkmatova, Osip Mandelstam, 
and Federico Garcia Lorca. And so on. 
 Two legal battles parenthesise Mendelssohn’s adulthood, both of them distinctly marked by 
her belief, as a young adult, that revolution was the solution. The first was the Stoke Newington 8 
trial of 1972, which was, until the recent phone-hacking scandal, the longest criminal trial in British 
history. Active in the London underground scene from at least 1970, Mendelssohn came into 
contact with members of the urban guerrillas, The Angry Brigade.33 Still lacking a well-researched 
history, and absent from most studies of contemporary terrorism, The Angry Brigade was part of a 
recognised wave of predominantly middle-class, educated youth who became disenchanted by the 
inefficacies of democratic protest. Of the same lineage as their infamous counterparts, including 
Weather Underground in the USA, the Front de Libération du Quebec in Canada, The Red Brigades 
in Italy, and Baader-Meinhoff in Germany, The Angry Brigade revolution was comparatively 
minimal, involving no murders or kidnappings. Their activities included about two dozen small-scale 
attacks, primarily bombings of largely unoccupied police stations, businesses, embassies, politicians’ 
residences, and a BBC van at a Miss World beauty pageant in 1970.34 Anna Mendelssohn’s 
fingerprints were discovered on a sheet torn from Rolling Stone magazine found in a bag containing 
one of those bombs. Fourteen sets of fingerprints were located in the same bag; eleven were never 
identified. Though Mendelssohn, scarcely 24 years of age, pleaded not guilty and defended herself in 
court with the brilliance and skill of a seasoned lawyer, she was convicted under conspiracy charges 
on December 6, 1972. Mendelssohn received a ten-year sentence, to be served at Her Majesty’s 
Holloway Prison in London, an institution that became female-only in 1903, and became well-
known for detaining the Pankhurst suffragettes.35 
 In prison, Mendelssohn taught her fellow inmates literacy, petitioned for improved 
conditions, and ran dramatic productions, including a performance of Peter Pan where she cast 
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herself as Captain Hook. These efforts prompted her early parole in 1977. Between 1980 and 1985, 
Mendelssohn had three longed-for children. In 1983, she changed her name by deed poll to Sylvia 
Grace Louise Lake.36 In 1984, she enrolled at the University of Cambridge. Mendelssohn’s writing 
indicates that the late seventies and early eighties were relatively happy years. Her love for her 
children runs palpably through her work; though always impassioned, her poetry in this period has a 
levity and whimsicality later overtaken by vehemence. This is not to negate the struggles associated 
with her twin, all-absorbing ambitions to be a parent and a successful student at an excruciatingly 
paternalistic institution. Mendelssohn believed that the community should help her raise her 
children; in a different world, this attitude might be incontrovertible. But one family upon whom she 
relied heavily desired a better routine, financial assistance, and the involvement of a third party: 
social services. For a woman who had served time, the scrutiny of her daily machinations by 
authority figures was a source of pronounced distress; still more worrying was the possibility that the 
vexed past she had scarcely put behind her might be unearthed in family court, to which 
Mendelssohn feared returning. Poverty exerted its daily grind, as did ill health and the stigma of 
single parenthood. In 1988, she gave permission to have her children temporarily fostered; they were 
never returned to her care. Mendelssohn’s case was harrowing and traumatising; when it was 
finished, the lawyer who defended her renouncedchild custody litigation.37 
 In the twenty years following the loss of her children, Mendelssohn read, wrote, and drew 
unremittingly. Now permanently housed at the University of Sussex, her archive is a phenomenal 
repository of visual art, nearly 800 closely-written notebooks, at least 5,000 poems, as well as a vast 
array of loose papers, letters, and memorabilia.38 Throughout these materials, Mendelssohn 
steadfastly rejects her political past, railing against and identifying with the Left and identity politics, 
feminism included. She professed her innocence, and her loathing of extremism and violence, until 
her death in 2009. 
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V 
In 1888, Verlaine asks: “is it not true that…the sincere poet will see himself, will feel himself, will 
know himself damned by the rule of any faction, o Stello?” The accursed poet is always at odds with 
himself and others, his spiritual and intellectual transcendence as “poet” undercut by an abjectly 
slippery slope of contradiction, descended wilfully and unstoppably. Eschewing category, existing on 
the margins of the culture that defines him, the accursed poet deliberately turns away from the good, 
right, and true in favour of immorality, incertitude, and error. Paradox is his pleasure: he exists to 
offer himself to masses who reject him; he clings passionately to a mortality replete with self-
imposed suffering, and likely brief. Perversion is his freedom: knowing full well what is reasonable, 
logical, and expected, he behaves foolishly and stubbornly, risking all in the (actively repressed) 
hopes of literary legacy, a future of inconceivable and ever-deferred accord. The Baedeker of this 
hapless, exalted journey is Alfred de Vigny’s Stello: A Session with Doctor Noir (1832), which pits the 
idealist poet and titular hero Stello against his psychiatrist, Noir. Stello believes that poetry can 
change the world, and Noir undertakes to cure Stello of his sentimental malaise. Stello is informed 
that poets are necessarily social pariahs, figures sullied by affiliation with the predictable mediocrities 
of waged labour, popular reception, and politics, the latter being the worst culprit in the destruction 
of poetic genius. Among the extensive exhibition of “melancholy phantoms” that Noir uses to 
illustrate his arguments we find “Dryden at seventy, dying in poverty and seeking in astrology a vain 
consolation for human injustice” (170). Against the dreadful fate of the beleaguered likes of Milton 
or Cervantes before him—a host of writers exiled, overlooked, ill, poor in their lifetimes—Doctor 
Noir offers a prescription: cultivate a purely perfunctory relationship to politics; work alone, 
avoiding institutions, affiliations, and audience; and finally, privilege endless contemplation over 
decisive action (179-80).  
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 Verlaine’s apostrophe to Stello voices his debt to Vigny, whose terms he extends throughout 
The Accursed Poets (1884; 1888). This essay anthology is interspersed with poems by the condemned 
rogues upon whom it rhapsodises: Tristan Corbière, Arthur Rimbaud, Stéphane Mallarmé, Marceline 
Desbordes-Lalmore, Villiers De L’Isle-Adam, and Pauvre Lelian (an anagram of Paul Verlaine), with 
Baudelaire as the absent presence at its heart.39 Verlaine celebrates their capacity to withstand life’s 
aches, pains, and injustices, as well as their rejection by the masses. Less prescriptive than Vigny, 
Verlaine is more hagiographic, more oxymoronic: his poets importantly suffer, but transcend that 
suffering through self-conscious genius; they are “exquisitely perverse, ravishingly chaste” (46). They 
do not need publications or audiences, but as Mallarmé has both, Verlaine dismisses these worrying 
tokens of success as “enormous minor detail[s]” (59). Stubborn contrariness is crucial to their 
combined fates: when poor, they reject money; when rich, they shun an easier life; obsessively, 
desperately in thrall to their art, they are nevertheless commanding, heroic. Verlaine thus 
demonstrates how, as we approach the twentieth century, sacrifice is increasingly posited as an 
authenticating individual choice rather than a societal ritual. Verlaine directly influences Arthur 
Symons’s The Symbolist Movement in Literature (1908), an anthology that replicates the terms and 
format of Les Poètes Maudits, celebrating madness, excess, and the “long vagabondage” of the lives of 
Verlaine and his underappreciated, accursed, poetic peers (34).40 The ethos of Les Poètes Maudits will 
similarly underpin the philosophy of Georges Bataille, for whom perversion, irrationality, and 
voluntary sacrifice are viable alternatives to confining necessity and “productive,” alienating labour.41 
Bataille turns to figures such as Van Gogh to drag the self-sacrificial mode of the accursed poet 
from its darkened back alley haven into the light of philosophical validation. For Bataille, Van 
Gogh’s severance of a body part is a literal, marvellous synecdoche of his disengagement with the 
world entire, a succinct measure of the artist’s capacity to rush headlong into the abyss of cultural 
alienation, a reinstatement of the declining “custom of sacrifice” (67).42  
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 So pervasive is the motif of the accursed poet that by 1964 Asger Jorn invokes it to decry its 
twentieth-century efficacy, surely the most obvious of maudit moves. Jorn’s portrait of Guy Debord, 
Lettrist-cum-Situationist International founder, evinces predictable features: poet-philosopher 
Debord is a member of a group of “bad boys who represent true originality” against whom the 
public “lashes out in good conscience…in order to cut them off permanently from creative activity” 
(158-59).43 Resilient against this severing, Debord instead refuses celebrity, admirably seeking a 
difficult and obscure life. And his sufferings and heroism far exceed those of his accursed 
predecessors: 
Paradoxically, the general sympathy toward modernism since the turn of the [twentieth] 
century, and especially since World War II when it was proclaimed that ‘the accursed artist 
no longer exists,’ represses these creative forces even more radically. The reality of social 
malediction is wrapped in a tranquilising and antiseptic appearance of emptiness: the problem 
has disappeared; there never was a problem. At the same time, the journalistic label of ‘accursed’ 
becomes, on the contrary, an immediate valorization. It is enough to get yourself cursed, to 
be all the rage. (157) 
 
Artists are now condemned only to be swallowed entire, assimilated into the culture they work 
against, writes Jorn, noting that this process originated in ancient sacrificial rituals. An outlaw genius, 
Debord cannot be neutralised in this manner. Jorn’s terms are well over a century old, with a 
significant distinction: “our hero” Debord differs from Doctor Noir’s ideal artists because Debord’s 
creativity promotes action, and by extension, engages directly in politics (161-62). These politics will 
come to fruition in the much-discussed relationship between the Situationist International and the 
events of May ’68.44 But in fusing sacrifice with the accursed poet, Jorn is in perfect accord with 
Vigny, who has Noir tell Stello: “The bloody sacrifice of a few men for many will continue until the 
end of the world. The nations will continue to buy their salvation forever by the substitution of 
expiatory suffering.’” (132). For Vigny, the poet cannot undo this truth, and will almost inevitably suffer 
from it. And so, at the close of Stello, Noir intones: 
‘The Poet bears a curse upon his life and a blessing on his name. The Poet, apostle of the 
ever-youthful truth, is a source of perpetual umbrage to the man of Power, apostle of an 
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obsolete fiction; for the one is inspired, the other has at best some power of concentration 
or some ingenuity of mind.’ (181) 
 
Power is convention, a product of the “‘ridiculous falsehood’” that is “‘social order’” (172). But if 
“‘[p]ower is irreconcilable with…poetic essence’,” the poet needs protection (173). And he is 
infinitely and infantilely fragile, as Noir details: “‘the Multitude, while carrying you in its arms, looks 
askance on you as it does on all its children, and from time to time it will throw you on the ground 
and trample you underfoot. The crowd makes a bad mother’” (165). In thrall to a vicious audience 
and his own indecisiveness, the poet passively awaits his muse. Verlaine will turn Vigny’s fragile 
poetic equivocations into capriciousness, the consequence of a gloriously contemplative will that is 
weak, perverse, self-serving. Jorn comfortably straddles both camps, exalting the accursed Debord 
still more for inhabiting a collapsing paradox. Throughout, vacillation and victimhood retain their 
heroism.  
 Though damned, the legacy of the accursed poet is pervasive, arguably at work since the 
fifteenth century, if not before.45 But its celebrated heyday is the decadent fin-de-siècle, itself delineated 
by the very paradoxes that define Verlaine’s les poètes maudits, not least being the pleasure taken in 
destruction, decline, and apocalypse. Luxuriousness, vice, and excess are on offer to ground heady, 
newfound uncertainties of intellection, and, crucially, aesthetic experimentation and indeterminacy. 
Who will read or care about this new verse? What does it achieve? Beneath Verlaine’s fatuous prose, 
genuine anxiety lurks. Verlaine demonstrates what Nordau will discern as key traits of the degenerate 
mind: an affinity for digression and “malevolent mania for contradiction” (319).46 Verlaine’s 
foreword likens “the verses of these dear Cursed ones” to “bronzes from decadent Rome,” 
prompting Verlaine’s arch query: “but what does ‘decadent’ really mean?” (11). “[T]hey call us 
‘decadents’” he notes later in the volume, adding, with satiric self-reflexivity superbly on show: “(an 
insult, between parentheses, implying picturesque, autumnal, with a setting sun, to sum it up).” 
Against these sullies, Verlaine invokes his damned poets’ pursuit of “the impeccable” (87). His 
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vacillations and protestations are admirably consistent; like Nietzsche, Verlaine avowed and 
disavowed his own decadence.47 Antipodal thinking allows Verlaine to trounce audiences in a text 
published with a view to making money, whilst arguing that what will lift the curse of his “admirable 
poet[s]” is success “—you understand?—” (123).48 Do we? Can we? The impossible pretence of the 
apolitical cursed poet is similarly maintained, so that Rimbaud’s sympathy with the Paris Commune, 
and his 1871 trek to participate in the insurgency, is reduced to “some stay in Paris, then diverse, 
more or less frightful pilgrimages” (60). Poetry is all, and Verlaine’s excisions and conflations reflect 
anthology content, encompassing the poetic terms of, say, Corbière’s “Epitaph” of himself, which 
celebrates a suicide caused by fervour and indolence, a lifelong “[v]igour without force” (17). And 
finally, Verlaine’s decadence allows his male subjects to incorporate femininity, of which the 
accursed poet-hero’s requisite martyrdom, or self-sacrificial bent, is a cogent indicator. This parodic, 
judicious identification with the feminine by European fin-de-siècle male authors is incisively 
delineated by Rita Felski, who points to cultivations of languidness and hypersensitivity, to their 
outward refusal of (“manly”) rationalism, utility, and progress.49 To this list we might add a turn to 
passivity, indecisiveness, incertitude, and weakness. 
Bearing in mind that for Nietzsche, circumlocution and dissidence are all, the genealogy of 
contemporary weakness he traces in The Anti-Christ (1888) begins with Christianity, which 
“proclaims a curse” against “intellectual well-constitutedness” that forbids roads to knowledge, and 
reduces doubtfulness to sin (hence Verlaine’s need to celebrate the “immorality” of the accursed 
poet, a figure unavoidably responsive to the Christian tradition).50 For Nietzsche, piety is a 
contagious illness, infecting “hysterical women and rickety children” who cannot effectively perceive 
or behave, and are thus ideal “expressions of décadence” (169). Nietzsche’s condemnatory linkages 
between faith, weakness, and effeminacy form the very motto of Anatole Baju’s journal, Le Décadent 
(1886-89): “‘Man becomes more refined, more feminine, more divine.’”51 Key to this strapline is that 
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man chooses to become, whilst woman is. As Felski writes: “Whether hailed as subversive or 
condemned as pathological, [the fin-de-siècle male’s] femininity signals an unsettling of automatized 
perceptions of gender, whereas feminine qualities in a woman merely confirm her incapacity to 
escape her natural condition” (1099). Lifelong pliancy and self-effacement define woman’s 
condition, as attested by Otto Weininger’s bestseller, Sex and Character (1903). For Weininger, 
womankind has no sense of her own destiny, and cannot “discern fate.” She may undertake the 
extreme measure of overcoming her victimisation and objectification by affecting hysteria, but these 
efforts are feeble and transparent: 
at the last moment [women] will kiss the man who ravishes them, and succumb with 
pleasure to those whom they have resisted violently. It is as if women were under a curse. At 
times she feels the weight of it, but she never flees from it. Her shrieks and her ravings are 
not really genuine, and she succumbs to her fate at the moment when it has seemed the most 
repulsive to her. (279)52  
 
Though anxious, the accursed poet works toward a destiny: the belated recognition of his genius. 
The accursed woman’s fate is violation and condemnation, a “slavery”; her “curse…is the evil will of 
man” but as “handmaid of the devil” it is a fate she deserves and upon which she depends (279; 
299). For Weininger, this curse is defining and inescapable; for Paul Julius Möbius, it is a stick with 
which to beat the persecuted. A German neurologist believed to have influenced Weininger, Möbius 
maintained in 1900 that if woman “‘fails in her duty to the species and insists on living her individual 
life for herself, she is struck as if by a curse.’”53  
So totalising is woman’s malediction that further attempts at damnation merely affirm a 
continuum. The elusiveness of this wilful execration is why the only woman in Verlaine’s anthology, 
Marceline Desbordes-Valmore, sits so uneasily amidst her unabashedly, triumphantly accursed peers. 
Distinguished from “negligible bluestockings” and the “proud and therefore male allure” of a 
George Sand, Desbordes-Valmore gains an entry in the second edition of Les Poètes Maudits because 
men Verlaine admires—Baudelaire, Rimbaud—have sung her praises (85; 115). Her talent is 
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qualified—“true albeit feminine”—and patronised as “adorable” (85). Desbordes-Valmore is 
celebrated for her self-effacement, as in the maternal anxieties of her poem “Renunciation”; her 
earnest, polite letting go of reason (which, naturally, abandons her first); and “[t]he entire forgetting 
of oneself” that marks both her love poetry and her envisioned legacy: “May my name be nothing 
but a soft, useless shadow, may it never cause fear or pain, may a pauper take it with him after 
talking to me and keep it long after in his consoled heart” (94). This is not a poet who yields to 
present-day obscurity with one eye on an assured, future fame. Gestures to decadent paradox can be 
discerned, as in “Letter to a Woman” that begins, coyly: “Woman, I know, shouldn’t write” (89). 
The speaker justifies her audacity because she writes only to be read by the beloved whilst suffering 
his absence; the poem culminates in a desire for his well-being predicated on the double-edged 
maxim: “wishing pain on one’s blessed other is to hate oneself” (90). But in the main, Desbordes-
Valmore’s speakers proclaim their loyalty, long to appease, and are often awash in helpless weeping 
over immoralities and uncertainties. The self’s “weak heart” is excoriated, thus making Desbordes-
Valmore “an angel” Verlaine is too “impotent to dissect” (110; 115). By these curiously rapacious 
terms, Verlaine cannot extend to Desbordes-Valmore the surgery he performs upon his accursed 
male peers, men distant enough from their own martyrdom that their self-sacrifice becomes either 
honourable orsatirisable. Against the predatory, predictable delicacy of Verlaine’s critical touch, 
feminist vanguardists to come will rail: “by instinct, woman is not wise, is not pacifist, is not good…. 
in somnolent periods of humanity she becomes too wise, too pacifist, too good” (111).54 These 
words belong to the Futurist Valentine de Saint-Point, and the somnolent period in question is 
assuredly languid decadence. Against the idealising, definitional curse, Saint-Point demands that 
“woman reacquire” a long forgotten, productive “cruelty and violence” (112).  
The historical vanguard to which the accursed poet belongs is inextricable from violence: the 
avant-garde positions itself at the forefront of a battalion, electing to be among the first to be 
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mowed down. Perceived as pacifist and “good,” women have always sat uneasily within this 
combative milieu, as critics have long discerned.55 The wilful occupation of binaries joyously defines 
the accursed poet, or he who is hero/martyr, glorified/condemned, absolute/vacillating. This same 
dualism constitutes a double indemnity for the female: too obviously, whore/Madonna, unified in 
eliciting ready condemnation. For the female vanguardist, indemnity is augmented: aspiring to the 
artistic experiments of male-defined vanguards, she also participates within “the feminist critique of 
sexual ideologies, including the sexual ideology of some of those same avant-gardes” (Suleiman, 
xvii). Debordes-Valmore’s poetry challenges male bravado, if only through the suspect persistence 
of its reverent passivity. But this critique is implicit enough that Verlaine can safely objectify its 
speaker, neatly sidestepping introspection in the process.  
Time may have worsened this split: consider Esther Leslie’s assessment of Anna 
Mendelssohn’s decades in Cambridge, where “she had some association, tangentially, with that most 
underground of poetic brotherhoods, the Cambridge Poets, now multigenerational” (28).56 
Multigenerational perhaps, but uni-gendered: Leslie lists eight affiliates, all male. Less diverse, then, 
than their Pre-Raphaelite forebears?57 Avant-garde women who fight fire with fire—Saint-Point 
among them—often threaten their male peers, and the social order writ large. And assuredly, this is 
the role undertaken by what is perceived to be the most extreme participant in the aesthetic/political 
vanguard binary: the contemporary female terrorist. For if there was ever a figure genuinely 
accursed, it is surely she, as Amanda Third’s Gender and the Political attests:  
In a manner that parallels Cesare Lombroso’s attempt to describe and categorise the female 
criminal in the late nineteenth century, [twentieth-century] terrorism studies has sought to 
delineate, and thus contain, the threat of the female terrorist. Terrorism studies discourse 
seeks to install clear-cut dimorphic boundaries, to categorise, name, and order, and in so 
doing, to (re)inscribe the limits of lawful opposition…. However, these distinctions always 
operate on uncertain ground, are always on the verge of collapsing…. And when the issue of 
gender is introduced into [these] uncertain hierarchies…the limits of its categories are 
thrown into sharp relief…. [P]recisely because terrorism studies operates with an 
overarchingly conservative understanding of gender—a framework that constitutes and is 
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constituted by the idea that femininity is obscure(d)—terrorism studies works to continually 
reproduce the female terrorist as elusive and unknowable. (47)58 
 
By thislineage, terrorism studies is feebly, deeply reliant upon the tactics of nineteenth-century 
intellectual and social history. And the worrying indefinability of the female terrorist is compounded 
by attempts to cohere two adamantly contrary discourses, both of which have underpinned readings 
of female protest since the fin-de-siècle. First, the female terrorist is the still more extreme other of her 
extreme male counterpart, and thus harbours an “unlimited capacity for violence, and…embod[ies] 
unfettered evil.” But as woman cannot be wilful or autonomous, she is only passively involved in 
terrorism as an extension of her “sexual and emotional affiliations with men” (Third, 44). This latter 
view informs The Demon Lover: The Roots of Terrorism, where celebrated activist Robin Morgan 
recounts how “Anna Mendleson, formerly of the Angry Brigade in the United Kingdom” publicly 
and emphatically acknowledged that the group’s activities effected no change. Morgan refuses to 
accept Mendelssohn’s disavowals as genuine criticism, stating instead, and with zero evidence to 
hand, that “they have the ring of disillusion voiced by women betrayed in love” (208).59 With 
feminists like these, who needs Weininger? An undated letter addressed to Morgan exists in 
Mendelssohn’s papers, deploring this unpermitted, slanderous misuse of her language and identity.60 
The missive remains unsent. Mendelssohn could not have been more acutely aware that any female 
branded a terrorist is perceived as the ultimate combatant and the least trustworthy victim. 
Elsewhere, often, Mendelssohn bitterly recounts how she “‘became known (with much revulsion) as 
the Angry Brigade girl.’”61 
 
VI 
In 1988, Mendelssohn pens a five-page tract, “One of the Forever Damned?”62 As the titular 
question suggests, the memoir manuscript continues the quest for certainty and quietude that 
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underpins “I thought I had all the answers.” Mendelssohn begins by discussing the study period 
preceding her final exams at Cambridge in 1986: 
I want to describe what happened at a crucial juncture. I was very happy at the thought of 
the coming examinations. It had given me great pleasure to work. It was such a quiet, useful 
thing to be doing for the children; for myself and for the children. I had never been so 
happy, regardless of all the problems. The positive part was that having worked hard I had 
ample material on which to concentrate to produce some good answers, to produce some 
answers which would have been interesting to write.  
 
This happiness is disrupted by a sense that unidentified individuals “were putting spokes in [her] 
wheel,” disrupting Mendelssohn’s attempt to give her “children […] a firm sense of [her] identity” 
via academic study, a plan that she claims elicited discouragement from female peers. Mendelssohn 
also perceives a more abstract threat: a man who lurks on the periphery and desires her death; this 
figure, clad in black, emerging “from the direction of the graveyard” might be literal or figurative, 
possibly oneiric, certainly nightmarish. She continues: 
A young woman had been sent from the North to help me with the children through 
the intensively important period prior to the examination week. I had it organized in my 
mind. However guilty I felt about enrolling other people’s help I knew that at some point in 
the not-too-distant future, I should be able to give help in return. But people are impatient. 
Impatient and Intolerant. 
The children’s help would not leave me alone to concentrate. I never lost my temper 
with her but I did try to gently explain that I could not work if she kept sailing into the room 
and cheerily chatting about all and sundry. Oh it hurt my heart sorely to have to be that 
woman with no time for anyone else. It would have been so much more beautiful to be able 
to lie on the rug and play with my relatively new-born baby [….] But it wouldn’t be long 
before I could play with her, hold her, gaze at her and stroke her cheek. It wouldn’t be long 
before I could draw all three of them on large pieces of cartridge paper, never ceasing to 
marvel at how they never stayed still for a moment. 
People who didn’t know what art was about would come and look at my drawings 
and say that doesn’t look like .… but they didn’t have the faintest idea of the process. To 
register anything about children is a miracle and a wonder; it is holy, it is innocent, it is life. 
What worries me is that I have given away everything before. I have seen my life 
being taken from me by people who thought that they deserved it rather more than I did 
[….] Life is such a learning process that it is hard to say that the uncertainties and fears of 
yesterday will not reveal themselves as natural and not just some terrible individual 
idiosyncratic deficiencies which had been branded into you from birth by a malevolent force 
who had been instructed to deem you one of the forever damned. 
A lady over the road who lived in a larger house offered me the use of one of her 
daughter’s rooms. “Install yourself in there” she said “and revise to your heart’s content.” 
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But after only one day she came to me with the news that her daughter was returning at the 
weekend and would need her room back. 
 Excuse me a moment, whilst I ring the bell for the manservant to bring me some tea. 
It is about four in the morning & I’m parched [….] 
 If I really had a manservant I would reach a more formed level in my writing, in my 
life; I could organise things, dimensions would fall into place, I would be more sure of 
myself and everyone whom I liked would think me a “lovely person.”63  
But no. I rush headlong into desperate sliding anarchy and this really offends my 
taste. Therefore I find myself offensive. I most certainly do object to this style of writing. 
 
Mendelssohn cannot find succour in her role as an academic parent; like the artwork that does not 
overtly represent her children, her intellectual aspirations are misunderstood. Her discomfort with 
realist aesthetics boils over into a rejection of the very prose she writes. She continues with a 
deprecation of old Communists and their sentimental, nostalgic, “[s]noring” autobiographies, 
referencing too-limited responses to leftist activity past and present, including the Rosenberg 
espionage trial in America in the fifties, and the women of Action Directe who are on hunger strike 
in a French prison. Her thoughts turn to her father, also an ex-Communist, and his political railings. 
Trouble and loss pervade these musings, as do unresolved attempts to protect her children’s 
psyches. “[M]usic saved” my own psyche, she observes, recalling instances of going without food to 
afford the opera. She concludes by returning to writing, remembering how, as a joke, she had once 
typed, “‘There is an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile buried in the back garden’” and handed it with 
exaggerated ceremony to her then-housemate, John Barker. “That piece of paper was produced as 
evidence against me in court” she comments ruefully, noting, by way of conclusion, that her father 
was right to tell her that writing is dangerous. 
 “One of the Forever Damned?” is fairly typical of Mendelssohn’s later prose, fraught with 
resistance to an evidently irresistible discursive autobiographical style, and replete with blame of self 
and others, even as it yields to Marceline Desbordes-Valmore’s idealistic “maternal tremblings!” 
(87).64 Mendelssohn admires and loathes vanguardists whose fate counters, replicates, or betters her 
own.65 She oscillates between indebtedness and entitlement, and these warring affects come to comic 
 © THIS ARTICLE IS COPYRIGHT SARA CRANGLE, 2017 
 
 
24 
fruition as she breaks off from her narrative of lived malediction to imagine herself a gentrified lady 
author with servants at her beck and call, rather than an impoverished student and single parent 
reliant upon ineffectual, temporary generosities.66 Desires for money, luxury, ease surface 
throughout Mendelssohn’s writings, often not so comically. Mendelssohn resents her political past 
for preventing ready access to employment, and her experimental proclivities for ensuring that she 
cannot earn a living by writing or art. Yet she cannot stop writing, justifying, protesting her personal 
injustices. Mendelssohn might be seen as the emblematic “graphomaniac,” a term Nordau lifts from 
Lombroso and defines as a person with a flaccid grasp on reality and “a strong impulse to write” 
(18); these compositions revolve repetitiously around the distressed self.67 But it is the very acuteness 
of Mendelssohn’s self-consciousness that troubles just such a diagnosis. Mendelssohn loved Auden, 
a truth that may well be tied to his famous suggestion that “poetry makes nothing happen.” Politics 
devoured Mendelssohn’s life; she did not want it to devour her artistry also. Instead, Mendelssohn 
wanted to wear politics down, grinding and hacking at its monumentality with a view to erecting a 
poetics free and clear of its contrivances. Paradoxically, this process involved a continual return to 
the site of the political. Still more paradoxical was Mendelssohn’s weapon of choice: she levied an 
assault on political system with the lived reality of the personal, all in the full and certain knowledge 
of the feminist maxim that the personal is political, that these realms are inextricable. This self-
imposed, irresolvable malediction was exacerbated by a gendered double standard that insisted its 
resilient, condemnatory way into her vanguardism.68 Hence Mendelssohn labels the female poet a 
“poetess.” An archaic term easily mistaken as satirically deployed, Mendelssohn sincerely values this 
gendered distinction, in part because it does fuller justice to the extent of her accursedness.69  
 “One of the Forever Damned?” is graphophiliac and graphophobic. A more universal 
language, music saves the psyche. In the academic world to which Mendelssohn aspires, words are 
savoured, definitive answers are requested and performed. In 1986, Mendelssohn proves incapable 
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of this performance, failing to get her Cambridge degree. For her, words are too perilously open to 
misinterpretation, to condemnation. “[H]ow close is writing to the Law, how ineffective and too 
much written in the weight of the law, to the poetess?” she asks.70 Or consider, again in infuriated 
catechistical style, from an untitled poem beginning “This is the reason why I do not conform.”:  
  The dangers in writing are inherent.  
Why it is dangerous to criticize the Establishment  
Openly. Why what amuses the Establishment  
is the Bad Use of language and Sex.  
Why women are discussed in terms of knickers.  
Why it is important not to lose control  
Of one’s own mind. Why Literature  
Frames novices. Why Framing is a sociopolitical act. (Implacable Art, 84) 
 
This extract is cautionary tale and lived truth: female objectification is relentless, and women 
critiquing the establishment risk both objectification and obliteration of the rational faculties. 
Mendelssohn spoke from long experience, as a single example from her youth illustrates. In 1969, or 
the same year that Mendelssohn took part in Godard’s British Sounds at the University of Essex, 
some students at Cambridge launched what became known as a Campaign Against Assessment. In 
the culminating move of their Situationist-inspired, year-long protest against the university, these 
students entered their exam halls in June 1969 and tore up their final examination papers.71 The 
gesture was public and deliberately inflammatory, highly symbolic and a genuine breaking of their 
three-year contract with Oxbridge. These students left the university without degrees in hand; 
among their number was John Barker, Mendelssohn’s housemate who received her missile missive, 
and who ultimately became her dock-mate. In 1972, Barker was convicted alongside Mendelssohn at 
the end of the Stoke Newington 8 trial.  
To fast forward abruptly: in 1989, or two decades after the Campaign Against Assessment, 
Mendelssohn makes a second attempt at completing the final year of a Cambridge degree in English, 
at completing the very exams Barker tore up. The day of her final exam, Mendelssohn writes a letter 
to her friend, Lynne Harries, describing the experience: “In a state of semi-paralysis I did the 
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exams—best two papers uncompleted—…Demoralised yet committed answers, too contentious—
I’m being hopeful when I say 2/2.”72 Having acknowledged the possibility of failure, Mendelssohn’s 
thoughts turn to Ed Dorn’s mentor, Black Mountain poet Charles Olson, whose work she is reading 
and wants to lend to Lynne’s daughter.73 As in her daily life, in this letter, Mendelssohn’s educational 
ambition is supplanted by her voracious auto-didacticism; the breadth and incessancy of her reading 
defies encapsulation.74 But the letter also elucidates the tragedy of an individual resolutely unable to 
articulate definitive answers; a person who begins, but leaves incomplete, at least three 
undergraduate degrees.75 Writing the poet and theorist Denise Riley in August 1990, Mendelssohn 
states that her “papers were ‘too academically unconventional for the Exam committee to feel (?!) 
that they were in a fit position to judge.’”76 In her stunning memoir of Mendelssohn, Harries 
counters this blasé appraisal:  
In the early summer of 1989, [Mendelssohn….] told me that the Finals results were posted 
on the Senate House but her own name was not on the list. This never happens, I kept 
saying, it’s a printing error. It wasn’t: she had ignored the questions on her papers and 
written a tirade against the lack of nursery provision in the university. Later, she petitioned to 
get the ‘Fail’ changed to ‘Unclassified’, leaving the academic door once again ajar….It is 
impossible to exaggerate the value she placed on being acknowledged as a serious, scholarly 
person.77 
 
The divergence that arises between Barker and Mendelssohn is self evident: where Barker’s 
Cambridge protest was a sacrifice heroic and historicised, Mendelssohn’s was a plea for help in the 
private, domestic realm she was expected to manage with innate aplomb. Mendelssohn strove to 
hold aloft drives academic, artistic, parental; she aimed to be Rimbaud and Desbordes-Valmore. 
Demoralised, committed, contentious, she found the role of une poètesse maudite the only habitable 
solution. But as this role is self-cancelling, Mendelssohn remained a no-label, a question mark, 
treating the Cambridge University Library through her fifties as a second home whilst retaining the 
status “unclassified.” 
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VII 
“Convictions are prisons,” Nietzsche intones (Anti-Christ, 172). But equally, freedom exists in 
irrefutable pronunciations—say, for instance, of one’s innocence. This is a contrary truth that 
Nietzsche’s method sustains. Nietzsche considered ressentiment a form of weakness or invalidism, in 
which the defensive and offensive instincts soften, and “everything hurts.” Against this infection 
there is only one cure, which Nietzsche labels Russian fatalism, or 
that fatalism without rebellion with which a Russian soldier for whom the campaign has 
become too much at last lies down in the snow. No longer to take anything at all, to receive 
anything, to take anything into oneself—no longer to react at all…. The great rationality of 
this fatalism, which is not always the courage to die but can be life-preservative under 
conditions highly dangerous to life, is reduction of the metabolism, making it slow down, a 
kind of will to hibernation…. (15)78 
 
Nietzsche claims that when convalescent, he experiences this state, “clinging tenaciously…to almost 
intolerable situations, places, residences, company, once chance had placed me in them” (16). After 
detailing these unbearable periods of passivity at length, the next section of Ecce Homo turns to war, 
asserting Nietzsche’s love of aggression, and his capacity to be an enemy with a strong nature: “to 
attack,” Nietzsche writes, “is with me a proof of good will” (17). An established philosophe maudit, it is 
via his fundamental discordancy that Nietzsche so comfortably, so prophetically lays claim to being 
both avant- and arrière-garde.79 Where avant-gardistes lead a battalion, the arrière-garde brings up the 
rear, continuing to fight even when defeat is imminent. Where avant-gardism becomes an aesthetic 
category in the first half of the nineteenth century, the arrière-garde does not come artistically into 
play until the 1950s, taking root in anxieties about the lost vitalism of the pre-war avant-gardes, and 
the concern that novelty is now traditional. Pre-World War I, the arrière-garde referred to artists 
hanging on to bygone traditions political and aesthetic; post-World War II, the arrière-garde begins 
to refer to “artists seeking to renew and defend the avant-garde legacy, to maintain the innovative 
strength of high modernism, in the knowledge that their efforts are belated and potentially 
anachronistic” (20).80 
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 Weak theory propagates encounters with the fullness of one’s decline, an experience not 
unlike Nietzsche’s fatalism, of clinging tenaciously, conservatively, to the terms of an all-but-finished 
battle. And the campaign it defends, and to which it returns, originates with decadence. This truth 
may be site-specific: in Italy, the birthplace of il pensiero debole, what Anglophones call modernism is 
decadentismo.81 But well beyond nomenclature, the defining terms of weak thought replicate decadent 
mores with stunning precision: dissolution, finality, resignation, weariness, passivity, invalidism, 
contagion, nihilism—all conduits to novelties aesthetic and intellectual, even as past tradition is held 
dear, sustained. Paradox frames weak theorists’ emphatic refusal of emphatic claims.82 And 
decadence is further discernible in weak theorists’ argument—objectionably privileged at best—that 
a society that has at last overcome material necessity can revel in the luxuries of incertitude and 
experimental aesthetics.83 In “Languor,” this very view prompts Verlaine to align fin-de-siècle 
decadence with the decline of the Roman Empire. Verlaine and Nietzsche have the temerity to 
openly recognise and disavow their decadent affiliations. This temerity wanes through twentieth 
century, where Marxists, Vorticists, and Futurists openly rail against the same. Decadence is an 
insult, even as theorists increasingly refute mastery in favour of a feminine passivity, heroising 
martyrdom, or the über-decadent mandate of les poètes maudits.84 Derided, decadent innovation 
determines contemporary vanguard practice in a manner that goes peculiarly unacknowledged, as 
though twentieth-century critics continued swallowing wholesale Marinetti’s self-serving, anxious 
rejection.85 Of late, Vincent Sherry has usefully expounded upon the wilful suppression and 
extraordinary influence of decadence upon the very modernist writers that insulted or dismissed its 
preoccupations, but Five Faces of Modernity (1977) is surely the forerunner in this regard, as author 
Matei Calinescu insists upon the virtual interchangeability of decadence and the vanguard.86 For 
Calinescu, decadent intellection precipitates the modernist thematic of crisis, and in turn, an all-
defining “unbounded relativism” (5). For Calinescu, today’s countercultural “questioning of unity” is 
 © THIS ARTICLE IS COPYRIGHT SARA CRANGLE, 2017 
 
 
29 
a decadent construct (312). Avant depends upon arrière. But weak theorists maintain that theirs is “a 
philosophy that some old-timers have erroneously tagged ‘decadent’ and ‘crepuscular’” when it is in 
fact “a positive, life-affirming, creative approach to life” (13).87 Easily incorporating both of these 
factions, decadence may prove more wilfully oscillatory than weak theory itself.  
In an untitled poem, Mendelssohn recounts the experience of “a woman [who] cries in the 
night between her innocent shoulders” even as “her mind was met by texts that held her.”88 Seeking 
reassurance, safe containment, this woman is at least partly grounded; “she cannot dive, there is no 
pool, she wants to stay in the rain today.” (Perhaps she too has already plummeted, “fallen young 
into [her] mind”?) Avoiding diagnosis, because psychiatrists would “be poets if they weren’t so rich”, 
“she tells the gulleys she left behind what it is to show that / confidential innocence is not 
universally exciting.” Furrows worn and well-travelled, gullies are also sharp knives, weapons. To 
these emblems of her past, this woman proclaims a secret, unacknowledged innocence, one that sets 
the world alight for no one but herself. The longing for an impossible absolution is comically 
scabrous, urgently palpable. Recognising herself as a humble member of the “country folk worn 
down over time”—“it’s country fairs we share”—the speaker moves beyond even this rural margin, 
running “off into the mists by the swamps where the convicts sank”. Eschewing the brand of the 
precocious, controversial artist, the enfant terrible, she takes on the guise of the feral “enfante 
sauvage,” one who “read[s] by the light of the moon.” In this embittered, enforced retreat, “Oscar’s 
spirit brushed her every movement into the powers of decadence.” The next, concluding line reads: 
“she learnt the merits of dissonance & watched the fairs fade.” The overt contrariness of Oscar 
Wilde, an artist who endured injustice, imprisonment, and was ultimately (almost) universally 
exonerated, sustains this enfante sauvage, permitting the past—and its painful ambiguities—to 
momentarily recede.  
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VIII 
Limitlessness as necessity risks obsession, “pain without end, the fall into bottomlessness” (127).89 
Signs exist of an emergent weariness with inexhaustibility. Charles Altieri argues that some key 
avant-garde mandates—semantic indeterminacy, a reliance upon the dogged continuities of readerly 
or audience reconstruction—replicate the social norms they challenge, affirming, for instance, the 
capitalist promotion of false autonomy and consumerist choice. For Altieri, the endlessness of 
aesthetic interpretation is not necessarily positive, and he wonders if criticism “can [now] only be 
‘authentic’ if it constantly undoes itself” (642).90 While Altieri advocates a revaluation of the too-
easily dismissed arrière-garde, Alain Badiou turns to revolutionary successes of 1848 to advocate 
contemporary political insurrection as an escape route from the confines of our painful, intervallic 
period, one where we appear reduced to witnesses of “[t]he continuation, at all costs, of a weary 
world” (1).91 Where Vattimo castigates pronouncements of critical and political ideologies as “partial 
thinking,” the vanguardist Anna Mendelssohn writes about the intolerability of studied neutrality in a 
poem sublimely entitled, “never beiger”: 
[….] I read of impassability 
& live in the interface between received ideologies 
which are both insulted and form armies 
as the dreadful milk evaporates up the walls 
the road poisonous to walk much distance upon92 
 
Against all battalions, be they avant or arrière, Mendelssohn posits the intractability of necessity, 
shamefully wasted sustenance, incapacitated free movement. The next line insists on stance-taking: 
“I am full of opinion which is the extraneity.” The speaker is a foreign element, an outsider, 
doggedly prepared to assert herself, if dogged by self-consciousness. 
 Vanguards aesthetic and political do not always intertwine, but against Verlaine’s 
indoctrination, le poète maudit Rimbaud is admired for emblematising this symbiosis, even as we 
remain ignorant of the details of his Parisian activism.93 Similarly, Mendelssohn’s opening speech in 
 © THIS ARTICLE IS COPYRIGHT SARA CRANGLE, 2017 
 
 
31 
the Stoke Newington 8 trial carefully delineates her political and artistic vanguard activity up until 
that point, whilst curiously eliding mention of a journey to France in spring 1968.94 If Mendelssohn 
failed to arrive in Paris, this “failure” would be consistent with her inability to complete degrees or 
to answer posed questions directly. In Implacable Art, she mocks “any who want poems to give them 
answers” because “a poem is not going to give precise directions / you mustn’t touch the hiding 
places. / they address a different world / where trees are decorated with diamonds” (34). 
Mendelssohn’s love of art, as for the decadents, was rooted in its capacious incompatibilities: in 
artifice, the experiential, extreme intolerabilities of ambiguity could affirm, could co-exist. So it is 
that Mendelssohn uses the personal to decimate the political, as when she alludes, rather often, to 
the Situationist International slogan, “Sous les pavés, la plage.”95 Consider “eulogy”: 
she smoothes her skirt 
to show her ineffectual language 
unhappy to be english speaking 
to the interesting sound of spoken greek 
but what could she say? this is music 
in comparison to what I speak 
& that is really the crux of her problem 
she feels another language not this one 
she is impressed. she wants to learn 
these new inflections.  
but will she be seized 
a traitor to the nation 
he sings a sentence between talking them 
it goes soft, it asserts, it narrates & 
faces change, animate, picking up 
on each others’ words 
it sounds a bit italian, a bit spanish, 
the girl who is with them 
told me 
that that was because they were speaking mediterranean. 
 
I could see the sea & hear the towns 
where the sea was calm & the buildings white 
in the distance.  
closer up were the boats 
it has turned my desire around 
I have travelled miles 
these people have brought liquid vowels 
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in trowels loading them from beaches 
& ports have delivered thoughts 
of mediterranean timing. 
       (Tondo Aquatique, n.p.) 
 
Accursed poet Corbière’s “Epitaph” proclaims that its speaker is “Too much his own to be able to 
suffer” and credits his demise to his unanticipated, yet foreseen “succes[s] as a failure” (18). 
Mendelssohn’s speaker mourns a lived past without Corbière’s comic assuredness; she fears seizure, 
the brand “traitor,” sentencing. Language is dangerous, targeted; in its diversity, language is 
unstoppably appealing. Within the poem, a shoreline demarcates. Elsewhere, in what may prove her 
magnum opus, “Silk and Wild Tulips,” Mendelssohn describes how “the beach was too large for 
reality.”96 In “eulogy” the poet travels miles to find “people [who] have brought liquid vowels / in 
trowels loading them from beaches.” The beach is uncontainable, liquid, sustained by manipulation 
and delivery; it is not an idealised expanse, a utopia just beneath the thin veneer of civilisation, 
tantalisingly within reach. What it might be, however, is a sounding board, an embankment. “And 
now that I’m not a revolutionary,” Mendelssohn writes in the late seventies, now “that I’m not 
trying to change the world…so that I don’t have to feel my pain—I’m overcome by wave upon 
wave of it.” In “eulogy,” the shoreline delimits and absorbs, and is defined in turn by a series of 
buildings: blank, rectilinear constructions. For Mendelssohn, the freshness of a clean sheet of paper 
is a requisite, proximate distance, an inviting port for syllables and thoughts. Necessary paths, 
necessary boundaries, “those thin lines of thought onto paper,” she writes in a letter in 1987, “are 
my raisons d’être.”97  
 
                                                 
NOTES 
A year-long research fellowship from The Leverhulme Trust facilitated research on les poètes maudits 
and decadence more generally. I would like to thank Anna Mendelssohn’s children for their generous 
permission to quote from her unpublished memoir and complete poems.  
In the citations below, all call numbers beginning “SxMs” refer to specific files in the Anna 
Mendelssohn Archive (1928-2013), University of Sussex Special Collections, The Keep, Brighton, UK. 
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1 This feminine, inherently divided self readily recalls the terms of Luce Irigaray’s This Sex Which is 
Not One (Trans. Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). The 
overlap may one of direct influence: in another work, this same poet offers a series of comically despairing 
apostrophes to feminists and theorists that includes Irigaray’s peer Cixous, as well as Derrida, Woolf, and 
Stein (Implacable Art. Cambridge: Folio Press, 2002, 19). 
2 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” in Weak Thought, ed. Gianni Vattimo and 
Pier Aldo Rovatti (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012), 39-52, 50. 
3 These lines contain questions that are cut off by the flow of the sonnet, form subduing content, and 
emphasising the otherness to which the speaker must acquiesce. Consider lines three and four: “her 
interpretations / suited her best should I have no where to lean my face.” “Should I have” is a concern 
begging debate; it is couched between the declarative assertion “suited her best” and “no.” “She” has gotten 
what she wants, but the divide between “no” and “where” emphasises that the answer to “should I have?” is 
an emphatic negation. This “no” prompts the next query: “where to lean my face”?  
Similarly, if punctuated interrogatively, the “had I words” of line ten might speak to a more 
loquacious past, or a halcyon vision of just such a past. The open-endedness of the line is corroborated by the 
uncertainty it articulates: “had I words I could confidently write.” Again, the unseen and unknown “you” 
aims at silencing, even as the questions persist. 
4 Paul Verlaine, The Cursed Poets, trans. Chase Madar (Los Angeles: Green Integer, 2003), 79.  
Et nunc et semper et in secula or “is now and ever shall be” is usually part of a longer Christian prayer, 
namely: “Glory be to the father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall 
be World without end. Amen.”  
5 Via part three of Thus Spake Zarathustra, Joan Stambaugh traces out these categories in The Other 
Nietzsche (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 25. 
6 Daniel W. Conway stresses the need to distinguish Nietzsche’s decline from the specificity of his 
décadence, arguing that the philosopher defined the latter as “a degenerative psychological condition”; see his 
Nietzsche’s Dangerous Game: Philosophy in the Twilight of the Idols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
For Conway, this condition “characteristically manifests itself as a growing disparity between the cognitive 
and volitional resources at one’s disposal; a yawning chasm that divorces intention from accomplishment; the 
widening gulf that separates what one wants from what one needs; and, most succinctly, an irreversible 
weakness of will” (14-15). 
7 “I am a child of my age as much as Wagner” Nietzsche writes in his preface to The Case of Wagner: A 
Musician’s Problem, adding, “i.e., I am a decadent.” Though acknowledging that “the philosopher in me 
struggled against” this realisation, he also states: “My greatest preoccupation hitherto has been the problem of 
décadence” (Trans. Anthony M. Ludovici, 3rd Ed. [Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1911], xxx).   
8 Andrzej Zawadski considers Levinas the first to use the metaphor of weakness as a critique of 
philosophical transcendence; see his Literature and Weak Thought (Frankfurt: PL Academic Research, 2013), 22.  
9 Richard A. Cohen, “Introduction: Humanism and Anti-Humanism—Levinas, Cassirer, and 
Heidegger,” in Humanism of the Other, trans. Nidra Poller (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), vii-xliv. 
10 According to Jon R. Snyder, the uprising is similarly pivotal, if not foundational, for Gianni 
Vattimo; see his “Translator’s Introduction” in The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-Modern 
Culture. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), vi-lviii, ix. 
11 See particularly, Levinas, Humanism of the Other, 17-18. I discuss Levinas’s vexatious relationship 
with art, one of dependency upon literary metaphor whilst eschewing the value ofthe same, in Prosaic Desires: 
Modernist Knowing, Laughter, Boredom, and Anticipation (Edinburgh: EdinburghUniversity Press, 2010), 16-19. An 
excellent source on this topic is Gerald L. Bruns, “The Concepts of Art and Poetry in Emmanuel Levinas’s 
Writings,” in The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, ed. Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 206-34.  
12 Levinas, Humanism of the Other, 67. Charles Baudelaire, “The Painter of Modern Life,” in The Painter 
of Modern Life and Other Essays, trans. and ed. Jonathan Mayne (London: Phaidon Press, 1995), 8. 
13 Arthur Rimbaud’s “Je est un autre” was penned in a letter dated 13 May 1871 (Arthur Rimbaud, 
Arthur Rimbaud: Complete Works, trans. Paul Schmidt (NY: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2008), 113. 
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14 Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Richard Philcox (NY: Grove Press, 2008) was originally a doctoral 
dissertation submitted under the title, “Essay on the Disalienation of the Black.”  
15 For one strong example of this resistance to Levinas’s radical passivity, see Robert J. C. Young, 
“Postcolonial Remains,” New Literary History 43 (2012): 19-42, 36-39. With colonial history in view, Young 
argues that the resolute, irresolvable “foreignness” of Levinas’s other insidiously augments a history of racial 
otherness. 
Cathy Park Hong offers a wonderful attack on the privileged mythology of post-identity in 
contemporary vanguard literature in “Delusions of Whiteness in the Avant-Garde,” Lana Turner: A Journal of 
Poetry and Opinion 7 (2014). 
16 As examples, witness Denise Riley’s impressive interrogation of identity and categories in The 
Words of Selves: Identification, Solidarity, Irony (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000) and ‘Am I That Name?’: 
Feminism and the Category of ‘Women’ in History (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). In the latter, 
Riley echoes Levinas’s terms, ruminating upon how best to answer the question: “‘At this instant, am I 
woman as distinct from a human being?’” (6). Her historically-oriented discussion of the vexatious yet 
ultimately necessary category that is “woman” is nuanced and comical, as when she asks: “Can anyone fully 
inhabit a gender without a degree of horror?” And answers: to do so is an “impossibilit[y]...far from the aims 
of feminism” (6). 
17 A typical, reactionary Nietzschean diagnosis of the risks of weakness, which is textually sandwiched 
between arguments against décadence, reads as follows:  
‘Equality’, a certain actual rendering similar of which the theory of ‘equal rights’ is only the 
expression, belongs essentially to decline: the chasm between man and man, class and class, the 
multiplicity of types, the will to be oneself, to stand out—hat which I call pathos of distance—
characterizes every strong age. The tension, the range between the extremes is today growing less and 
less—the extremes themselves are finally obliterated to the point of similarity…. (Twilight of the Idols 
91) 
18 While there is anecdotal agreement and poetic evidence that the ideologies of May ’68 influenced 
Mendelssohn, there is no certain proof that she was in Paris during the uprising. Tom Clark’s Edward Dorn: A 
World of Difference (Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 2002) quotes Jennifer Dunbar Dorn discussing “a small 
contingent of Essex academics” travelling across the English Channel in the spring of 1968. A member of 
their party allegedly sent a manifesto-style telegram to the Times, stating that the journey was undertaken as a 
show of support for the Parisian uprisings. Dunbar Dorn specifically identifies “Anna Mendelsohn” (the 
spellings of her name are incredibly variegated) as among their number (39). At this time, the American poet 
Ed Dorn was lecturing at the University of Essex. In 1987, Mendelssohn and Dorn appeared together in the 
first issue of an ephemeral vanguard journal, The News (1987). 
In a letter dated 4 May 1987, Mendelssohn describes travelling by car to Paris with Ed Dorn and 
three or four others (SxMs109/3/C). Like Dunbar Dorn, she makes no reference to an arrival, an omission 
that may be rectified as more of Mendelssohn’s archive isexplored. At present, this omission is replicated in 
two under-researched texts that describe the mass exodus of British students to Paris in May ’68. 
Mendelssohn’s associates are named as protesters, and Mendelssohn is once loosely identified as among the 
contingent by the appropriately pseudonymed “Tom Vague.”  See Tom Vague, Anarchy in the UK: The Angry 
Brigade (London: AK Press, 1997), 20; and Gordon Carr, The Angry Brigade: A History of Britain’s First Urban 
Guerilla Group (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010), 19. Another confusing source: in 1972, a televised 
documentary on The Angry Brigade states that Mendelssohn was in Paris in 1968; though she is interviewed, 
she is not asked, and does not volunteer any information about that event (see footnote 57).  
At the end of this essay, I’ll point to a fifth source that maintains this ambiguity. But in the 
meantime, a sixth: an email exchange with Mendelssohn’s close friend Lynne Harries (May 16/17 2016) 
confirms that Mendelssohn never spoke of direct involvement in May ’68. But then again, nor did she 
outright deny being there. 
19 Mendelssohn was born on June 17, 1948. She began her degree at Essex in 1967.  
20 Though the tide is slowly turning, little is written on this era of student protest in England. Works 
such as Johnathan Green’s All Dressed Up: The Sixties and the Counterculture (London: Pimlico, 1999) go some 
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way toward bridging this gap. That said, a typical assessment of this period in England arises in The British 
New Left (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993) where Lin Chun describes how, with the exception 
of Scottish R. D. Laing, intellectual and political influences of this period were all “imports,” including Mao, 
Fanon, Althusser, and Che Guevara. Noting that the London School of Economics and universities at Essex, 
Hornsey, Hull and Birmingham were key sites of  late-sixties student protest, Chin nevertheless sums up 
rather dispiritedly: “British society was the only major industrialised society which did not generate a 
competitive militant student movement, nor a vigorous and coherent theory for such a movement” (93; 87-
88). 
An extant Essex alumni website offers a detailed account of university protests from 1967-1969, 
including references to coverage in the national papers (http://www.essex68.org.uk/). 
21 Mendelssohn refers to these events in her notebooks and correspondence; “the fourteenth flight” 
in Viola Tricolor (Cambridge, UK: Equipage, 1993, unpaginated) is dedicated to Godard. 
22 These journals include Strike!, Frendz, and possibly Tariq Ali’s Black Dwarf.  
23 There are almost two dozen portions of this memoir, roughly dateable from the late seventies to 
the early nineties; I have edited a portion entitled What a Performance (1987) that is forthcoming with the 
“Little-Known Documents” section of the PMLA The entirety is episodic, and discrete sections are 
identifiable by stationary, type fonts, inks, and/or pagination, as well as a degree of narrative continuity and 
closure. “I thought I had all the answers” is untitled, typed, and contains very minor edits in Mendelssohn’s 
hand. In the passages provided, smaller spelling errors and typos are silently corrected (SxMs109/1/B/1/5). 
24 In each instance in this typescript, “each other” is rendered as “eachother”. 
25 In the original, this sentence reads: “I’d slowly progressed from world politics to local politics to city 
(London) politics to local politics”. 
26 Ian Bone discusses this trip to Wales, or more specifically, Oxwich Beach, Gower, Swansea, in his 
Bash the Rich: True Life Confessions of an Anarchist in the UK (Bath: Tangent Books, 2006), 45. 
27 SxMs 109/1/B/1/5. 
28 There are numerous references to Emmanuel Levinas in Mendelssohn’s papers. For instance, a 
quote from his Collected Philosophical Writings is jotted down on a scrap of paper in SxMs109/5/B/2/58. 
29 SxMs 109/1/C/4. 
30 See files SxMs 109/1/C/1-3 (1958 to 1968). 
31 In the nineties, Mendelssohn published three collections with Rod Mengham’s Equipage Press: 
Viola Tricolor (1993), Bernache Nonnette (1995), and Tondo Aquatique (1997). A fourth, The Day the Music Died 
(1993) was a very limited edition. In 2009, her final chapbook, Py., appeared with Oystercatcher Press. 
32 Mendelssohn’s first anthology entry was for Wendy Mulford’s The Virago Book of Love Poetry, a 
collection encompassing female poets from Sappho to Alice Walker (London: Virago Press, 1990). Denise 
Riley included Mendelssohn’s poetry in Poets on Writing: Britain, 1970-1991 (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 
1992); in 1996, Mendelssohn and Riley appeared in Maggie O’Sullivan’s Out of Everywhere: Linguistically 
Innovative Poetry by Women in North America and the UK (Hastings: Reality Street Editions, 2nd ed. 2006). 
Mendelssohn is included in Iain Sinclair’s Conductors of Chaos: Poetry Anthology alongside J. H. Prynne, Drew 
Milne, and Caroline Bergvall (Picador; 1996). Finally, in 2004, Mendelssohn contributed to Rod Mengham 
and John Kinsella’s Vanishing Points: New Modernist Poems (London: Salt Publishing); Lynn Hejinian, Peter 
Riley, Marjorie Welish, and Stephen Rodefer are among the poets in this volume. 
33 It is likely that she met or knew of some of these individuals whilst at Essex.  
34 The attacks for which the Stoke Newington 8 were ultimately held accountable occurred between 
1970 and 1971, and are outlined in Gordon Carr’s The Angry Brigade (54-57). People laying claim to the name 
“The Angry Brigade” continued detonating bombs as late as 1984. For the communiqués and another 
timeline of Brigade activities, see The Angry Brigade: Documents and Chronology, 1967-1984, ed. Jean Weir 
(London: Elephant Editions, 1985). In court, Mendelssohn admitted to contributing to communiqué 12. 
35 Mendelssohn was initially charged with credit card and cheque fraud on 21 August 1971. By 
November 1971, the charges were augmented to conspiring to cause explosions to endanger life or property. 
Mendelssohn stood trial with James Greenfield, John Barker, Hilary Creek, Christopher Bott, Stuart Christie, 
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Angela Weir, and Kate McLean. Mendelssohn, Greenfield, Barker, and Creek were sentenced; Bott, Christie, 
Weir, and Maclean were found not guilty. 
36 Mendelssohn’s first legal name change took place on 10 March 1983, where she went from Anne 
Mendleson to Sylvia Grace Louise Lake. On 18 March 1997, she reverted, again legally, to Anne Mendleson, 
noting on the document that the English usage of her name was “Anna” (SxMs 109/1/9/1).  
From 1998, her work is published under the name Anna Mendelssohn, and with respect for the final 
public preferences of this intensely private individual, it is under the name Anna Mendelssohn that her 
archive is identified.  
37 Lynne Harries, “The Northern Debutante: A Memoir of Anna Mendelssohn.” MA dissertation, 
unpublished, University of East Anglia, submitted 2013, 16 (SxMs109/1/A/1). 
38 Mendelssohn’s three children – Poppy, George, and Emerald – generously donated their mother’s 
archive to Special Collections at the University of Sussex in 2010. Via negotiations with the British poet Peter 
Riley, I brought the archive to Sussex, and then spent some years writing funding grants for cataloguing. I was 
eventually fortunate enough to locate funds to hire an archivist, Simon Coleman, and to regularly work 
alongside him throughout his year-long contract. The archive was opened to the public in autumn 2015. 
39 Desbordes-Valmore, L’Isle-Adam, and “Pauvre Lelian” were added to the second edition; see 
Francis F. Burch, S. J., “Paul Verlaine’s Les Poètes Maudits: The Dating of the Essays and the Origin of the 
Title,” Modern Language Notes 76 (1961): 752-55, 753. Critical interpretations of Verlaine’s seminal text are 
surprisingly few. “Les Poètes maudits is among the most frequently cited literary studies of its period” writes 
Burch, but his brief article, now over five decades old, remains one of the only critical sources in English 
wholly devoted to this anthology (753).   
40 Symons writes a series of short essays in praise of Villiers de L’Isle Adam, Rimbaud, and Mallarmé 
in his 1908 edition, adding Jules Laforgue and fiction writers—Huysmans, for instance—into his mix. Also 
like Verlaine, Symons’s second edition (in 1919) extends his authorial list. 
41 I refer broadly here to the terms of Bataille’s three-volume The Accursed Share: An Essay on General 
Economy, trans. Robert Hurley (NY: Zone Books, 1988 and 1993). 
42 In full, Bataille’s quote reads: “in our day, with the custom of sacrifice in full decline, the meaning 
of the word, to the extent that it remains a drive revealed by inner experience, is still as closely linked as possible 
to the notion of a spirit of sacrifice, of which the automutilation of madmen is only the most absurd and terrible 
example.”  See “Sacrificial Mutilation and the Severed Ear of Vincent Van Gogh,” in Visions of Excess: Selected 
Writings, 1927-1939, trans. Allan Soekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 61-72, 67. The 
essay was originally published in 1930. 
43 “Guy Debord and the Problem of the Accursed,” Substance 90 (28.3)(1999): 157-163. This piece 
was first published as the introduction to Debord’s Contre le Cinéma (1964). 
44 The distinction here may well be historical, as Vigny writes self-consciously in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution, while Jorn writes in the social and ideological tumescence of the mid-sixties. The 
distinction is also blurry: the same year that Jorn writes his homage to Debord, the Situationist International 
(hereafter SI) publishes a “Questionnaire” defining its politics by negation and paradox: “The SI is neither a 
political movement nor a sociology of political mystification….the SI insists on a permanent revolution of 
everyday life.” See “French Journals, #9,” in Situationist International Anthology, ed. and trans. Ken Knabb 
(Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets, 2006), 174-188, 178-79. Though surrealism is considered a direct (and 
certainly more immediate) influence, the central SI aim is discernibly Dadaist: to eliminate the distinction 
between art and life. In its use of paradox and negation, the SI is arguably still older in its origins, plausibly 
decadent. 
Formed in Northern Italy in 1957, the SI united the Movement for an Imaginist Bauhaus, which 
included Jorn, and Lettrist International, led by Debord. In 1962, the SI experienced a factional split, 
prompting the formation of a second SI, one that aimed to be more political. At this juncture, Debord rose to 
prominence, as attested by the now-canonical status of his charged Society of the Spectacle (1967). See also Peter 
Wollen, “The Situationist International,” New Left Review 1 (1989): 1-18. 
45 Though the coinage of the term follows later, French fifteenth-century poet Francois Villon is 
often identified as the originator of the accursed poet existence: experimental poet, engaging in vice, dying in 
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ignominy, recognised posthumously. Villon was selectively translated by Dante Gabriel Rossetti and Pound, 
and by the contemporary American poet Stephen Rodefer, meaning that vestiges of the accursed poet 
identifiably span more than five centuries. 
46 Wilde turned type—“an Oscar Wilde”—is a key site of uncontrollable contrariness. Elsewhere, 
Nordau explains that “a weak mind…chatters according to the current of the association of ideas, wanders in 
his talk, and neither knows himself what he wishes to arrive at, nor is able to make it clear to us”; see Max 
Nordau, Degeneration, 2nd Ed., trans. unidentified (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1895), 84.  
47 Having described the poet as the empire in its final decadence in “Langour,” Verlaine forswore the 
movement by 1891. M. S. Silk, “Nietzsche, Decadence, and the Greeks,” New Literary History 35 (2004): 587-
605, 591. 
48 See Burch (footnote 37) regarding Verlaine’s production of the volume for money. 
49 Rita Felski, “The Counterdiscourse of the Feminine in Three Texts by Wilde, Huysmans, and 
Sacher-Masoch,” PMLA 106 (1991): 1094-1105, 1094. 
50 See footnote four. 
51 Qtd. in Barbara Spackman, Decadent Genealogies: The Rhetoric of Sickness from Baudelaire to D’Annunzio 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), viii. 
52 Otto Weininger, Sex and Character, 6th Ed., trans. unidentified (New York: AMS Press Inc., 1975) 
(replica of 1906 edition). 
53 This quote is drawn from Möbius’s The Mental Inferiority of Women: On the Mental and Physiological 
Deficiency of Woman (1900), which proved an enormously popular publication; qtd. in Cinzania Sartini Blum, 
The Other Modernism: F.T. Marinetti’s Futurist Fiction of Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 
119. 
54 Valentine de Saint-Point, “Manifesto of the Futurist Woman (Response to F.T. Marinetti),” 1912, 
rpt. in Futurism: An Anthology, ed. Lawrence Rainey et al. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 109-12. 
55 Susan Rubin Suleiman’s Subversive Intent: Gender, Politics, and the Avant-Garde (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), remains an outstanding guide to this conundrum. Kathleen Fraser’s 
collection, Translating the Unspeakable: Poetry and the Innovative Necessity (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama 
Press, 1992), incorporates autobiography and essays to articulate the cultural positioning of the female 
experimental writer. Additionally, Elizabeth Frost’s The Feminist Avant-Garde in American Poetry (Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 2003) considers the divide that continues between feminism and women’s aesthetic 
vanguard. For instance, the latter eschews the personal or confessional style that prompted the second-wave 
feminist recovery of more mainstream female writers.  
56 Esther Leslie, Bouleversed Baudelairizing: On Poetics and Terror (London: Veer Books, 2011). Leslie 
claims that through the 1990s, an invitation to the annual Cambridge Conference of Contemporary Poetry 
(CCCP) was considered a mark of approval by the brotherhood in question. Though Leslie states otherwise, 
archival records show that Mendelssohn did participate in the 1991 CCCP, and that she was also included in 
the programme of the 1997 event (SxMs109/5/C/2 & 7); Mendelssohn’s correspondence with Rod 
Mengham suggests that she debated attending and reading in 1998 also, but eventually declined 
(SxMs109/3/A/1/34). 
57 Christina Rossetti and Marie Spartali are the obvious contenders for inclusion in the Pre-Raphaelite 
Brotherhood, and Griselda Pollock writes brilliantly on Elizabeth Siddall’s artistry in Vision and Difference: 
Feminism, Femininity and the Histories of Art (London: Routledge, 1988).   
58 Amanda Third, Gender and the Political: Deconstructing the Female Terrorist (New York: Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2014). 
59 Morgan quotes from a source that is in turn, referring to a thirty-minute documentary that included 
an interview with Anna Mendelssohn and fellow activist (later, inmate) Hilary Creek. Conducted in Wales in 
1972, the documentary was directed and televised by “World in Action” (1963-1998), a renowned BBC 
current affairs programme. In her interview, Mendelssohn’s discussion is purely political, and makes no 
mention of any romantic affiliations whatsoever (www.christiebooks.com).  
60 SxMs109/3/B.  
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61 This specific quote is drawn from the final page of a five-page typescript of Mendelssohn’s 
memoir, likely written in the mid- to late eighties, and possibly titled, “what a poem.” (SxMs109/1/B/1/37).  
62 This prose work is a fair copy manuscript, lightly edited, and paginated in Mendelssohn’s hand. She 
gives it a title page, writing the title centrally and “by Grace Lake” in the bottom right-hand corner. She 
identifies herself as entering her fortieth year in the text (SxMs 109/1/B/1/41). This work is one of many 
instances where Mendelssohn contemplates herself as martyred or cursed. For instance, in a letter to her sister 
and brother-in-law, she states: “I always felt hated” adding: “I always thought that one blessed rather than 
cursed, or if one did Curse it should be an ephemeral curse not one that speared its victim to produce it as a 
conquered demon or devil or anti-Christ or exemplar of Heresy” (SxMs109/1/E/1/6). 
63 “[M]ore formed” could be “more formal”; “organise things” could be “Organise things”. 
64 Perhaps obviously, this expression is Verlaine’s. 
65 In this instance, these three categories are met, respectively, by: 1) self-promoting old male 
communists, 2) female activists (preferably artists: Ethel Rosenberg was a singer and actress), and finally, 3) 
leftists on behalf of whose innocence the public rallied as it did not for Mendelssohn (decades-long protest 
and interrogation exonerated Rosenberg of her crime). 
66 This is a trope Mendelssohn refers to her in poetry, as in ““I don’t want to be a lady novelist / In a 
summer dress” (Implacable Art 60). In her “womanifiasco numero una”—a manifesto she devised with her 
children in 1985—Mendelssohn offers another humorous rendition of the same, demanding to know when 
she, like the men she knows, will be entitled to a woman in a pinny or apron, who will wait on her hand and 
foot (Grace Lake, “MAMA: womanifiasco numera una,” independently produced, dated “Cambridge 1985,” a 
copy of it is held at the British Library). 
67 The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that the term precedes Nordau and Lombroso; usages from 
1895 stress “‘restless repetition of one and the same strain of thought’” and fixation upon one’s “‘own mental 
and moral ailments’”. *Note to Paul: 67 is a rewritten footnote* 
68 Consider the following, from Mendelssohn to her cousin Barry Benser: “The poet is always trying 
to heal what politics would tear asunder—the human spirit.” Another letter to Barry illustrates her untenably 
feminist, yet anti-political position, via Mendelssohn’s interest in the surrealist Gisele Prassinos: 
She was a young poet like I was, and if there is any motive behind what I want to do it is only that I 
want it to be known, some day, that some girls are young poets and that society is not always, 
perhaps rarely, kind to us. I despair when everything is handed over to politics. Perhaps it is – 
perhaps that is the final Reality, but I dont want to subscribe to that final reality. (15.4.97; 
SxMs109/1/E/1/7). 
69 La poétesse maudite is not Mendelssohn’s terminology. In Mendelssohn’s poetry, “poetess” is used to 
signal feminine victimisation, as in “On Vanity” of Tondo Aquatique, which begins: “When a poetess is raped 
she loses her interior life. / In an attempt to understand the intensity of the pain / She seeks for her 
perpetrator in other forms” (unpaginated). A letter to poet Peter Riley illustrates how seriously Mendelssohn 
took the term, and the gendered difficulties of writing: “How much of a woman one is as a writress, a poetess 
(not a poet – it is strange how difficult it seems, or has seemed to be to communicate the difference that is 
not necessarily any less literary and/or intelligent) has not been helped by anyone deflecting me from poetry” 
(15.1.[no year], SxMs 109/3/A/1/52). Elsewhere, Mendelssohn describes the pragmatism of being a feminist, 
particularly in sixties Britain; again, her terms border on the persecutory, as she suggests that women’s poetry 
was “absent in the late 1960’s, absent and illegal” (1.9.2008, SxMs 109/3/A/1/68). 
70 To this question, Mendelssohn adds: “How controlled I am, no-one normal could stand this being 
driven to distraction by sheer prejudice” (1.9.2008; SxMs 109/3/A/1/68). 
71 Other tactics included sit-ins, occupations, debates, and lecture disruption. The campaign began 
after the March 1968 protest against the Viet Nam war in London, which involved over 10,000 protestors 
(news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/17/newsid_2818000/2818967.stm). It was hoped that 
this protest would spark a series of events in England comparable to what took place two months later in 
France (Carr, The Angry Brigade, 32-33). Many Essex students were at this march; alumnus Chris Ratcliff 
recalls Mendelssohn as present among their number (email dated 17.05.2016).  
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72 In England, a 2/2 is earned for marks between 50 and 60%. Given that the British do not use the 
full range of marks (it is very unusual for students in the Arts and Humanities to earn anything above an 80), 
a 2/2 amounts to a low pass. 
73 SxMs109/3/A/1/18. 
74 A single Mendelssohn notebook (again, there are nearly 800) will include notes on Forster, 
Boccaccio, Cromwell; another on Auden, Tillie Olson Benjamin Brittan, the letters of Peter Plymley, Waugh, 
Longfellow, and extracts from The Sunday Times. 
75 Mendelssohn did not complete her degree in comparative studies at Essex, leaving the university 
just months before her final exams. She began another degree in fine art in at the University of Sheffield 
Hallam in the early eighties; no evidence exists that she completed that degree before she started at 
Cambridge in 1984. She makes frequent mention of attempting to apply for degrees in London and Oxford 
whilst in prison; evidence exists that she embarked upon a Foundation Year Art programme at what is now 
called the University of Anglia Ruskin in or about 1978 or 1979.  
76 20.8.90; SxMs109/3/A/1/51. 
77 Lynne Harries, “The Northern Debutante,” 17-18. 
78 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: 
Penguin Books, 1992). 
79 Nietzsche’s writings indicate an incorrigible arrogance even as he signed his late letters, “The 
Crucified” (Silk, 600). These polarities have contributed to his legacy as “the isolate and embattled individual” 
(R. J. Hollingdale, “The Hero as Outsider,” in The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Bernd Magnus and 
Kathleen M. Higgins [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 71-89, 87). 
80 Natalie Adamson and Toby Norris, “Introduction,” in Academics, Pompiers, Official Artists and the 
Arrière-Garde: Defining Modern and Transitional in France, ed. N. A. Adamson and T. Norris (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 1-25.  
81 According to Matei Calinescu, the Italian term decadentismo emerged in the twentieth century, and 
refers to the cultural transition from nineteenth-century romanticism into, and including, modernism. See 
Calinescu’s Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Postmodernism (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1987), 168, 178, 212-13, 218-19. 
82 Consider the stunningly po-faced: “Any…claim to possess the only possible reality contradicts the 
nihilistic principle of the infinite interpretability of the world, and must be refuted” (Jon R. Snyder, xxv). 
83 This is a sentiment espoused by Vattimo: “The ruling concepts of metaphysics...turn out to be 
means of discipline and reassurance that are no longer necessary in the context of our present-day 
organisation and capability of technology” (“Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought,” 43). And in the same 
volume, Franco Crespi asks: “is the weak position to remain fatally the thinking of the elite and therefore still 
a form of Enlightenment?” (“Absence of Foundation and Social Project,” 253-68, 255). Crespi answers 
affirmatively (if implicitly), arguing that weak theory is possible because of “the improvement in material 
structural conditions of present-day developed societies” (257). Whilst laying claim to a deeply ethical 
premise, by its own terms, weak theory does not pertain to at least two thirds of the global population.  
On a much lesser scale, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick is similarly problematic. Her otherwise outstanding 
diagnosis of the hermeneutics of suspicion, “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,” poses the following 
question: “How television-starved would someone have to be to find it shocking that ideologies contradict 
themselves, that simulacra don’t have originals, or that gender representations are artificial?” See Touching 
Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 141. An answer might be: 
how insularly radical are the circles in which you move that you do not regularly encounter peers or strangers 
who insist on the need to dress girl children in pink, or casually dismiss a male child’s aggression as “boys will 
be boys”? While I take Sedgwick’s point that solutions are needed more than self-perpetuating interrogations, 
part of the urgency she describes is tied to the fact that these offhand violences continue to define our every 
day.  
84 For an excellent source on this subject, see Anne-Lise François, Open Secrets: The Literature of 
Uncounted Experience (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). Here François points out that contemporary 
theorists rely upon “supremely feminine virtues” among them, “not knowing (modesty) and not doing 
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(chastity)” (26). She challenges Levinas and Blanchot, among others, on their propagation of passivity as 
ethics, noting that within these discourses that refute mastery lies a risk of “hyperbolis[ing] as a mode of 
secret heroism the readiness to go unrecorded” (28). 
85 Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde dismisses decadence outright, and Renato Poggioli’s 
similarly titled and seminal theory nods all-too-briefly in its foundational direction. 
86 See Vincent B. Sherry, Modernism and the Reinvention of Decadence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015. 
87 Peter Carravetta, “Introduction,” in Weak Thought, ed. Vattimo and Rovatti, 1-38. 
88 This untitled poem is drawn from the same unpaginated collection—Tondo Aquatique (Cambridge: 
Equipage, 1997)—as the sonnet with which this essay begins. It begins with an epigraph from An Duanaire, 
1600-1900: Poems of the Dispossessed, trans. Thomas Kinsella, ed. Sean o Tuama (Gerrards Cross, 
Buckinghamshire, UK: Colin Smythe Ltd., 1981.  
89 Alessandro Del Lago, “On the Ethics of Weakness: Simone Weil and Nihilism,” in Weak Thought, 
ed. Vattimo and Rovatti, 111-37. 
90 Charles Altieri, “Avant-Garde or Arrière-Garde in Recent Contemporary Poetry,” Poetics Today 20 
(1999): 629-53. 
91 Alain Badiou, The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings (London: Verso, 2012). 
92 Mendelssohn, “never beiger,” Tondo Aquatique, n.p. 
93 Renato Poggioli argues that it is only with Rimbaud, during the Paris Commune, that we see the 
two vanguards in simultaneous operation, an assertion against which Calinescu takes legitimate umbrage 
(Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity, 113). Kristin Ross scathingly and discerningly discounts scholars’ ongoing 
need to determine, once and for all, what Rimbaud factually did between March and May 1871 with the 
following: “Even to pose the question in this form reveals the anxiety of the empiricist working in the service 
of reductivism—a reductivism that most likely has political (recuperative) motivations”; see her The Emergence 
of Social Space: Rimbaud and the Paris Commune (London: Verso, 2008), 32. 
94 SxMs109/2/D/5. 
95 Other poems that reference this slogan include Mendelssohn’s “the fourteenth flight” in the 
unpaginated collection, Viola Tricolor (1993). As the poem moves to its conclusion, she describes being 
psychologised, watched, judged by “the fidgeting tax payer” or the “uniform and corporate and attuned.” 
This broad-based “they” observes our speaker, eventually curbing their remarks “upon how various paving 
stones seem to make me jump up and down”. The paving stones inspire a cartoonish rage, suggesting that the 
legacy of May ’68 retains its influence. But, by poem’s end, the same speaker comments: “beats me that’s all 
those closed mouths […] had to organise a political justification for writing poetry”. As previously noted, the 
poem is dedicated to Godard. 
96 This achingly beautiful poem is published in Bernache Nonnette (1995) and Out of Everywhere (1996; 
2006). Evidence suggests that Mendelssohn may have composed this poem over a period of thirty some 
years. 
97 2.3.87; SxMs109/3/A/1/3. 
